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Julius G. Getman and Thomas C. Kohler
The Story of NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Telegraph Co.: The
High Cost of Solidarity
Few cases in the labor law canon have generated more vigorous
debate or sparked more heated criticism than the Supreme Court’s 1938
Mackay opinion.1 The decision represents one of the Court’s earliest
interpretations of the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. On
its way to holding that an employer may not discriminate on the basis of
union activity in reinstating employees at the end of a strike, the Mackay
Court also instructed that an employer enjoys the unrestricted right
under the statute permanently to replace strikers.
Although stated as dictum, the latter proposition, which quickly
became known to lawyers and scholars as the ‘‘Mackay doctrine,’’ has
remained an important, if highly controversial, aspect of American labor
law. After nearly seven decades, the doctrine continues to provoke the
notice and the nearly universal condemnation of scholars. Commentary
on the case in the classroom and in the literature tends to run from
bewilderment (‘‘Why did the Court reach for an issue not properly before
it?’’) to the more darkly suggestive (‘‘Mackay seems to represent the
triumph of entrenched property rights thinking on the part of the
justices over new notions of workers’ rights’’), to the flatly condemnato-
ry (‘‘The case stands as a prime example of the judicial de-radicalization
of the Wagner Act’’). The criticism is understandable.
The Mackay doctrine, as it has emerged, effectively hollows out the
protections the Act affords strikers. The rule forbids employers to
discharge workers who engage in a legal strike. At the same time, it
allows employers to hire other workers to take their jobs. The replaced
1 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
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striker remains an employee, but one who enjoys only a preferential
claim to the prior position, if and when it becomes vacant, and only if the
former striker has been unable to find comparable work. This distinction
between discharge and replacement, critics charge, is the sort that only a
lawyer could love—or even have imagined. To most contemporary ob-
servers, the doctrine undermines the right to strike, a right given special
acknowledgment in the Act. Mackay, they note, makes it a peculiar right,
the exercise of which may lead to the loss of one’s job. Critics also point
out that by weakening the right to strike, Mackay inadvertently under-
mines the institution of collective bargaining. As the Supreme Court has
observed, the strike is ‘‘part and parcel of the system’’ the NLRA
established, and constitutes ‘‘a prime motive power for agreements in
free collective bargaining.’’2 Critics also argue that the rule upsets the
neutrality toward the parties that the Act’s framers intended the statute
to embody.
Although the majority of contemporary commentators denounce
Mackay, in 1938 it was heralded as a great victory for the National
Labor Relations Board.3 The Board’s General Counsel, Charles Fahy,
described it as a ‘‘gratifying’’ result which settled crucial constitutional
and statutory interpretation issues, while the Union’s President, Mervyn
Rathborne, hailed it as a ‘‘complete vindication of the three-year fight of
the union for reinstatement of the locked-out workers involved.’’4 End-
of-the-Court-Term assessments of the opinion by newspaper analysts5
and the relatively small amount of law review commentary the case
produced regarded Mackay as an important victory for the Wagner Act
and for workers’ rights.
As surprising as it may seem to us, the decision’s striker-replace-
ment language received little notice from observers at the time. The first
piece critical of Mackay did not appear until 1941, three years after the
decision was announced.6 It would remain the sole critical piece for some
2 NLRB v. Insurance Agents’ International Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
3 E.g., Decision Protects American Workers, The Boston Evening Globe, May 16, 1938,
at 1; Court Backs Strike Right—Labor Board Scores in Mackay Case—Job Not Forfeit by
Walk Out, The Boston Morning Globe, May 17, 1938, at 1; The Shape of Things, The
Nation, May 21, 1938, at 573.
4 Lauren D. Lyman, High Court Upholds NLRB in Mackay Radio Strike; Reopens
Republic Case, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1938, at 1, 12.
5 Dean Dinwoodey, Labor Law Wins High Court Tests, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1938, at
62; Lewis Wood, Court Again Helps New Deal, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1938, at 40.
6 Leonard B. Boudin, The Rights of Strikers, 35 Ill. L.Rev. 817 (1941) (The author of
this piece would become one of the best-known civil rights lawyers of the 1960’s, who
represented, among others, Paul Robeson, Benjamin Spock, Daniel Ellsberg and the Cuban
government. He was the great-nephew of Louis Boudin, a prominent labor lawyer and Karl
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time. Serious and sustained criticism of the Mackay rule did not appear
in the literature until the 1960’s.
What accounts for this? If it is of such moment, why was so little
mention made initially of Mackay’s striker-replacement rule? Why does
the case hold such different significance for us than it did for our
predecessors? Why was it accepted at a time when the cause of labor was
a primary concern of academics and liberals, but not today, a time when
organized labor is in disarray and has far less support from intellectuals?
The answers lie partly in the history of the case, but more significantly
in the development of labor law and industrial relations in the years
since Mackay was decided.
The holding of the case is relatively straightforward. Its history,
however, takes some surprising turns and recounting it may reveal some
of the basic problems and tensions that underlie the scheme of the
National Labor Relations Act and the social understandings on which
the statute rests.
Social and Legal Background
1. THE STATUS OF STRIKERS AT COMMON LAW
The NLRA became law on July 5, 1935. Now a mature statute with
its basic principles well-established, one easily can forget the difficult
choices its drafters confronted in framing its language, and the number
of unforeseen problems that were left to be worked out through the
process of what Justice Frankfurter called ‘‘elucidating litigation.’’ It is
also easy to forget that concepts very familiar to us had to be puzzled out
over time by workers, their employers, the courts and other actors.
Among these concepts are some that today hardly seem problematic at
all: the definition and significance of a strike, the legal status of strikers,
and the determination of when a strike ends.7 We can best comprehend
the problems the drafters faced concerning these issues by looking
briefly at the basic common law doctrines that informed their thinking.
Any discussion of basic principles of American labor and employ-
ment law must take the employment at-will rule into account. That rule
exerts a deep and often unnoticed gravitational pull on every aspect of
Marx scholar, and the father of two children who took rather different paths with regard to
the law. His daughter, Kathy Boudin, was a member of the radical Weather Underground
group that was implicated in a series of bombings across the U.S., including the Pentagon,
the Capitol building, and the headquarters of the New York Police Department. She served
twenty years for the robbery of an armored truck during which a police officer was killed.
Louis’ son, Michael, became a prominent conservative jurist and a judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.)
7 For two examples of cases where such determinations were legally significant, see
West Allis Foundry Co. v. State, 186 Wis. 24, 202 N.W. 302 (1925); Dail–Overland Co. v.
Willys–Overland, Inc., 263 F. 171 (N.D. Ohio 1919).
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the structure and operation of our employment regulatory schemes. It
also conditions our ideas about the status and rights of strikers and their
relationship with their employer.
Without doubt the most famous statement of the at-will rule comes
from the Tennessee Supreme Court’s 1884 opinion in Payne v. The
Western and Atlantic R.R. Co.8 There, the defendant railroad, presum-
ably to protect its company-owned stores from competition, threatened
to discharge any of its employees who bought goods from an independent
merchant. The merchant, whose highly successful business was thereby
destroyed, brought an action in tort against the railroad. The railroad,
arguing in part that it ‘‘had the right to discharge employees because
they traded with plaintiff, or for any other cause,’’ successfully moved
the trial court to dismiss the complaint.
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion
that the merchant’s complaint stated no cause of action. If a master can
direct his domestic servant not to trade with a merchant, the court
reasoned, how could it be censurable if a master forbade a greater
number from doing so? And if the law permits a master to withdraw his
trade from a firm, how could it be unlawful for that master to order his
servants to cease their trade, even if doing so will result in the failure of
the company’s business? The railroad’s threat to discharge employees
who continued to shop at the plaintiff’s stores, the court concluded, also
constituted no wrong. Employers, the court stated, ‘‘may dismiss their
employees at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or
even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of a legal
wrong.’’
Notions of mutuality justified this rule. The right the employer
enjoys ‘‘is a right which an employee may exercise in the same way, to
the same extent, for the same cause or want of cause as the employer.
He may refuse to work for a man or company, that trades with any
obnoxious person, or does other things which he dislikes. He may
persuade his fellows, and the employer may lose all his hands and be
compelled to close his doorsTTTT’’ In this way, the Court declared,
The great and rich and powerful are guaranteed the same liberty
and privilege as the poor and weak. All may buy and sell when they
choose; they may refuse to employ or dismiss whom they choose,
without being thereby guilty of a legal wrong, though it may
seriously injure and even ruin others.
The writer Anatole France parodied such formalized notions of even-
handedness in his 1894 book, The Red Lily, as the ‘‘majestic equality’’ of
8 81 Tenn. 507 (1884). (The spelling of the word ‘‘employee’’ in quotes from the
opinion has been modernized.)
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the law ‘‘which forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to
beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.’’9 Adam Smith expressed a
similar skepticism about the law’s symmetry. In contests between mas-
ters and servants, he observed,
It is not TTT difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon
all ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the dispute, and force
the other into compliance with their termsTTTT In all such disputes
the masters can hold out much longerTTTT Many workmen could not
subsist a week, few could subsist a month, and scarce any a year
without employment. In the long-run the workman may be as
necessary to his master as his master is to him; but the necessity is
not so immediate.10
Unions soon would temper the rigors of the at-will rule through the
inclusion of language in collective bargaining agreements that required
an employer to have just cause to discharge an employee. Clauses
limiting an employer’s ability to discharge employees began to appear in
collective agreements during the 1880’s.11 But the court in Payne did not
elaborate on the rights of employees who accepted the invitation and
withheld their work as a group to protest their employer’s decisions. Had
they not voluntarily quit their jobs? Could not the employer offer to
others the positions the strikers had surrendered?
By the beginning of the twentieth century, common law courts
largely had settled these issues. In his frequently cited concurrence in
the 1908 case of Iron Molders’ Union v. Allis–Chalmers Co., for example,
Judge Grosscup instructed that
A strike is cessation of work by employees in an effort to get for the
employees more desirable terms. A lock out is a cessation of the
furnishing of work to employees in an effort to get for the employer
more desirable terms. Neither strike nor lock out completely termi-
nates, when this is its purpose, the relationship between the par-
ties.12
As the Seventh Circuit subsequently would observe in Michaelson v.
United States, when workers strike, ‘‘[t]hey are no longer working and
receiving wages; but in the absence of any action other than TTT looking
to a termination of the relationship, they are entitled to rank as
9 Anatole France, The Red Lily 91 (Winifred Stephens, trans., Wm. H. Wise & Co.
1930).
10 Adam Smith, 1 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 83–
84 (R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976).
11 Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the United
States and England: An Historical Analysis, 5 Comp. Lab. Law 85, 121–22 (1982).
12 166 F. 45, 52 (7th Cir. 1908) (Grosscup, J., concurring).
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‘employees,’ with the adjective ‘striking’ defining their immediate sta-
tus.’’13
The discussions of the status of strikers in the Iron Molders’ and
Michaelson cases, like that in other court decisions dealing with the
issue, were incidental to appeals testing the granting or the limits of a
labor injunction. The question of the employment status of the strikers
was crucial to the question of their legally-protected right to picket and
to engage in other activities seeking to persuade others not to take jobs
with the struck employer. As employees, strikers had the right to make
such appeals because the end sought—the betterment of their wages and
working conditions—was lawful. In contrast, strangers with no employ-
ment-related interests to protect would be presumed to be acting out of
malevolent and hence legally actionable motives.
The Iron Molders’ opinion well illustrates these points. While enjoin-
ing threats of violence, the use of abusive or vile language and like acts,
the court permitted the union to picket all the foundries in the city and
county of Milwaukee in furtherance of a dispute over wages and working
conditions. It also refused to enjoin striking members of the union from
following work that had been transferred from the struck employers to
foundries in other cities. As the court explained,
[i]f appellee [the struck employers] had the right (and we think the
right was perfect) to seek the aid of fellow foundrymen to the end
that the necessary element of labor should enter into appellee’s
product, appellant [the union members] had the reciprocal right of
seeking the aid of fellow molders to prevent that end. To whatever
extent employers may lawfully combine and co-operate to control
the supply and the conditions of work to be done, to the same extent
should be recognized the right of workmen to combine and co-
operate to control the supply and the conditions of the labor that is
necessary to the doing of the work.14
The formal equality of the parties under the law, and their equal
freedom to act in pursuit of their self-interest, governs the rationale and
outcomes of these cases. As the Michaelson court explained, ‘‘In the
industrial combat the two sides must have equal and reciprocal rights in
exerting economic pressure TTT the strike was only tolerated as a weapon
on one side because the other side was armed with an equivalent
weapon.’’ The ‘‘mutual freedom’’ of employers and employees to bring
economic pressure on one another, the court instructed, ‘‘is the vitals of
‘collective bargaining’ or any bargaining.’’15
13 291 F. 940, 943 (7th Cir. 1923).
14 166 F. at 52.
15 291 F. at 943–44.
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The formal equality of the law did not require effective equality. The
common law did not seek to limit employer exercise of its economic
power. The at-will rule, then-regnant concepts of contractual freedom,
and formalized ideas of equality permitted employers to use devices such
as yellow-dog contracts, by which employees agreed, as a condition of
their employment, not to join a union or to attempt to organize fellow
employees. Employers also remained free to discriminate against or
discharge employees suspected of union activity, to use spies and to
maintain blacklists, to establish company unions and representation
plans to frustrate attempts at unionization and to employ other tactics
designed to undermine strikes and to thwart other self-help efforts
undertaken by their employees.
Commenting on the state of the law as it existed on the eve of the
New Deal and the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act of
1933, the labor historian Irving Bernstein noted that
It was not true, however, as sometimes charged, that the law was
tilted in the favor of employers. Labor relations law, statutory and,
to a lesser extent, decisional, was characterized by a spirit of
toleration. In theory there was essential equality. Workers might
lawfully organize and bargain collectively, while employers with
equal legality might frustrate freedom of association and refuse to
bargain. In the realities of the market place this hypothetical bal-
ance gave the employer the advantage.16
Labor economist William Leiserson, who among many other activi-
ties in a very busy life was an arbitrator; the Executive Secretary of the
National Labor Board (1933); the Chairman of the NLRB (1939–1943); a
professor of economics at several schools including Johns Hopkins; and
an advisor to Senator Robert Wagner, characterized the equality of the
parties’ rights under the law somewhat more pungently. ‘‘The law,’’
Leiserson said, ‘‘recognized the equal freedom of the employers to
destroy labor organizations and to deny the right of employees to join
trade unionsTTTT All that the employees had,’’ Leiserson continued,
‘‘was a right to try to organize if they could get away with it; and
whether they could or not depended on the relative economic strength of
the employers’ and employees’ organizations.’’17
The short-lived National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) was passed
in June 1933, a few months after the Roosevelt administration assumed
office. The NIRA had many goals: its labor provisions were intended to
promote effective equality under law between employers and employees
16 Irving Bernstein, The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy 7–8 (1950).
17 William M. Leiserson, Right and Wrong in Labor Relations 26–27, quoted in
Bernstein, The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy at 8.
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by protecting the right of workers to organize and ‘‘to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection.’’ These provisions, set forth in § 7(a) of the
NIRA,18 anticipate the language of § 7 of the NLRA. The construction
given the NIRA’s labor provisions would establish important ‘‘common
law’’ principles that would be carried over to the framing and adminis-
tration of the terms of the NLRA.
2. STRIKERS, STRIKER REPLACEMENTS, AND THE NIRA
When enacted by Congress, the NIRA established no procedures for
enforcement of its labor provisions. To remedy this problem, President
Roosevelt authorized the creation of the National Labor Board (NLB) on
August 5, 1933, which had the duty to investigate and mediate industrial
disputes, and later to conduct representation elections. The following
year, Congress passed Public Resolution No. 44 authorizing the Presi-
dent to create a three-member National Labor Relations Board. The
President subsequently issued the Executive Order establishing the
NLRB on June 29, 1934. The Order gave the Board the power to
investigate controversies, to hold hearings and make findings regarding
complaints of discrimination or discharge of employees under § 7(a), to
conduct elections, and to arbitrate disputes when requested. The Order
also empowered the NLRB to establish regional offices throughout the
United States, staffed with examiners and labor mediators and headed
by regional directors, to assist the Board members in administering the
NIRA.
The NLB and NLRB were unencumbered by any body of precedent
save that they established for themselves, and their decisions have a
certain inventively ad hoc quality about them. On issues involving the
status of strikers and striker replacements, however, the NLB and the
NLRB quickly adopted a familiar set of rules. When a strike occurred in
reaction to an employer’s breach of the terms of § 7(a), the NLB and the
NLRB would order the reinstatement of the strikers, if necessary,
18 Section 7(a) provided that:
Every code of fair competition, agreement, and license approved, prescribed, or issued
under this title shall contain the following conditions: (1) That employees shall have
the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of
labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization
or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection; (2) that no employee and no one seeking employment shall be
required as a condition of employment to join any company union or to refrain from
joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organization of his own choosing; and (3) that
employers shall comply with the maximum hours of labor, minimum rates of pay, and
other conditions of employment, approved or prescribed by the President.
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displacing workers hired as their replacements.19 In its decision in L.
Mundet & Sons, Inc., for example, the NLRB explained that, ‘‘Where
violations of Section 7(a) have provoked a strike, the appropriate restitu-
tion is reinstatement of all the strikers in preference to men hired
during the strike.’’20 In contrast, where the strike was economically-
based, the strikers had no claim to reinstatement at the close of their job
action. As the NLRB observed in its Fischer–Jones Co. decision, ‘‘We
have held on a number of occasions that in the absence of a violation of
Section 7(a) the company is under no obligation to discharge employees
taken on during the course of a strike to replace striking employees.’’21
The Board’s Century Electric Co. case provides a good illustration of
these principles. There, discrimination charges were filed on behalf of
strikers who were not reinstated following the end of a strike over wage
rates. The Board found no evidence of bad faith bargaining on the
company’s part or of any discrimination practiced by it against any
individuals, including members of the strike committee. The Board also
noted that the company continued to reinstate strikers as the need for
employees arose. ‘‘The case for the employees,’’ the Board observed,
‘‘seems reduced to the contention that the TTT [replacements] who were
hired during the strike should be dismissed to make way for TTT strikers
who have not been reinstated.’’ Such a complaint was legally insuffi-
cient. ‘‘In the absence of persuasive evidence that a violation of Section
7(a) by the company has caused all or some of TTT [the replaced
employees] to be out of work, there is no legal basis for requiring the
company to make room for them by discharging other employees.’’22
Like the opinions of courts in civil law countries, Board decisions of
this era appeared without dissents. The view of the NLRB about the
reinstatement rights of economic strikers, however, may not have been
unanimous. Board member Edwin S. Smith seems to have taken a stance
that diverged from that of his colleagues, Harry A. Millis (a University of
Chicago economist) and Lloyd Garrison (the Dean of the University of
Wisconsin Law School).23 A former newspaper reporter, researcher for
the Russell Sage Foundation, personnel director for Filene’s Department
Store (a famously progressive Boston employer) and Commissioner of
Labor and Industries in Massachusetts, Smith quickly gained a reputa-
tion as the most pro-labor NLRB member.
19 E.g., A. Roth & Co., 1 N.L.B. 75 (1934); Eagle Rubber Co., 2 N.L.B. 31 (1934).
20 2 N.L.R.B. 198, 199 (1935).
21 2 N.L.R.B. 236, 239 (1935).
22 Century Electric Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 79, 81 (1934).
23 Garrison remained on the Board only for a short period, and was replaced as
Chairman by Francis Biddle, a Philadelphia lawyer with a background in corporate law.
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In a memorandum he circulated to the other NLRB members, Smith
put forth the position that replaced economic strikers should be entitled
to reinstatement at the end of a strike. The threat of a strike and the
strike itself, Smith maintained, ‘‘are properly included within the bar-
gaining process.’’ A striker ‘‘must therefore be regarded still as an
employee who is attempting by voluntary abstention from work TTT to
influence the employer to broaden the terms of the bargain.’’ It follows,
Smith argued:
If at any time during the progress of the strike a worker, or group of
workers, go to the employer and state they are willing to resume
their working relationship TTT the employer must receive them back,
displacing if necessary other workers who may have been hired
during the period of the strikers’ absence from workTTTT When
strikers have declared their willingness to return to work on the
employer’s own terms, the utility of the strike breaker to the
employer has ended. As a tool the strike breaker can be discarded—
as an employee, dismissed.24
Smith failed to convince his colleagues to depart from the estab-
lished doctrine regarding the rights of replaced economic strikers. Early
versions of a bill that would evolve into the National Labor Relations
Act, however, would for a time reflect his viewpoint.25
3. ‘‘EMPLOYEE,’’ STRIKER REPLACEMENTS, AND
THE LABOR DISPUTES BILL OF 1934
At the urging of the American Federation of Labor, Senator Robert
Wagner took up the issue of the recall rights of economic strikers in his
doomed labor disputes bill of 1934. The direct precursor of the National
Labor Relations Act, the bill intended ‘‘[t]o equalize the bargaining
power of employers and employees’’ and ‘‘to encourage the amicable
settlement of disputes’’ between them. The bill addressed the issue of
the recall rights of strikers in an indirect fashion, by providing that the
term ‘‘employee’’ as used in the statute ‘‘shall not include an individual
who has replaced a striking employee.’’26
24 Edwin S. Smith, The Status of Strikers as Employees, National Archives, RG 25
(Records of the National Labor Relations Board) quoted in, John A. Logan, The Striker
Replacement Doctrine and State Intervention in Labor Relations, 1933–38, Industrial
Relations Research Association Series, 1 Proceedings of the Fiftieth Annual Meeting 347,
349–50 (1998).
25 For accounts of the shortcomings of the NIRA’s labor provisions and the many
problems confronted by the first NLRB in enforcing the terms of § 7(a) of the NIRA, see
Section 1 under Prior Proceedings infra.
26 Labor Disputes Act, S. 2926, 73d Cong. § 3(3) (1934).
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Not surprisingly, the exclusion of strikebreakers from the protec-
tions the bill afforded employees drew a torrent of criticism from
employer groups. The exclusion, they argued, would lead to a variety of
problems. For example, striker replacements, no matter how long they
might work for an employer, could never gain employee status under the
bill’s terms. Consequently, it appeared that they would be permanently
barred from enjoying the legally-protected right to bargain collectively
with their employer.27 Likewise, replacements could never participate in
a union election, while those whom they replaced seemingly would retain
an indefinite right to vote, even if they long since had gone to work for a
different employer.28 James Emery of the National Association of Manu-
facturers complained that the bill made the replacement worker ‘‘a legal
cipher’’ and that this was done ‘‘by those who express profound interest
in human right [sic].’’29
Academic advisors to Wagner made similar points concerning the
limbo to which the bill’s definition of employee consigned replacement
workers. Professor John Fitch of the New York School of Social Work,
for example, noted that the bill would cause someone taking a job as a
strikebreaker ‘‘to retain his non-employee status permanently.’’ Fitch
advised Wagner that no ‘‘harm would be done by dropping TTT [the]
reference to strike-breakers altogether.’’ Wagner replied that Fitch’s
criticisms were ‘‘exceptionally well taken’’ and that they ‘‘will be invalu-
able to me when I attempt to iron out this legislation.’’30
The discrimination practiced against black workers by many unions
further muddled the striker-replacement issue. T. Arnold Hill of the
National Urban League, who wrote to Wagner expressing the League’s
‘‘unqualified approval of any measure that seeks to equalize the bargain-
ing power of employers and employees,’’ nevertheless objected to the
labor disputes bill because its language would permit labor organizations
to exclude African–Americans from membership and it failed to protect
them from acts of racial discrimination by labor unions. The bill also
would deny to African–American ‘‘workers the status of ‘employees’
when they are engaged as strike-breakers in occupational fields where
they are prohibited from joining the striking union.’’ To remedy this
27 1 NLRB Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act, 1935 at 535 (Henry
I. Harriman, President, United States Chamber of Commerce) (hereinafter Legislative
History).
28 Id. at 721 (Leslie Vickers, American Transit Association).
29 Id. at 406.
30 John A. Logan, The Striker Replacement Doctrine and State Intervention in Labor
Relations, 1933–38, Industrial Relations Research Association Series, 1 Proceedings of the
Fiftieth Annual Meeting 352 (1998).
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wrong, Hill recommended that the bill’s definition of employee be
revised to read:
The term ‘‘employee’’ shall not include an individual who has
replaced a striking employee, except when the labor organization
either by direct constitutional or ritualistic regulation and/or by
practices traceable to discriminatory policies bars an individual from
joining such labor organization or restricts rights, privileges, and
practices usually accorded members of such labor organizations.31
In an internal Urban League memorandum, Hill warned that if Wag-
ner’s labor disputes bill ‘‘passes in its present form, the power and
influence of the labor movement will be greatly enhanced with the
consequent danger of greater restrictions being practiced against Negro
workers by organized labor.’’ As presently framed, Hill continued, ‘‘the
bill favors labor organizations, but does not benefit employees who
replace striking employees.’’ The discriminatory practices of unions, Hill
observed, forced African–Americans ‘‘to work as strikebreakers when
strikes are called by unions that bar them. As strikebreakers, they have
no rights under the proposed’’ statute. Consequently, their ‘‘position will
be made worse as that of other workers is enhanced.’’32
In response to their arguments, Wagner promised the leadership of
the League that he would give ‘‘sympathetic consideration’’ to their
concerns and that he remained ‘‘very receptive’’ to any language that
would assist the League in accomplishing its objectives. Wagner pro-
fessed that he was shocked ‘‘to find a measure which I have introduced
to protect all working men [might be] used as an instrument to discrimi-
nate against some of them, and I shall examine my bill with the utmost
care to prevent any such eventualities.’’33
The criticisms had effect. When Wagner introduced a revised version
of the bill, the striker replacement exclusionary language was gone. It
would not reappear, nor would any further reference be made concerning
the status of striker replacements in Wagner’s National Labor Relations
Act, legislation he introduced in the next session of Congress in Febru-
ary 1935.
31 1 Legislative History at 1058–59.
32 T. Arnold Hill, Acting Executive Secretary, National Urban League, April 3, 1934,
Memorandum to all Coworkers, Library of Congress, NAACP Papers, Group 1, C–257,
quoted in John A. Logan, The Striker Replacement Doctrine and State Intervention in Labor
Relations, 1933–38, Industrial Relations Research Association Series, 1 Proceedings of the
Fiftieth Annual Meeting 352 (1998).
33 Letter of Robert F. Wagner to Lloyd Garrison, April 14, 1934; letter of Robert F.
Wagner to Dr. D. Witherspoon, quoted in John A. Logan, The Striker Replacement Doctrine
and State Intervention in Labor Relations, 1933–38, Industrial Relations Research Associa-
tion Series, 1 Proceedings of the Fiftieth Annual Meeting 353 (1998).
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4. STRIKER REPLACEMENTS AND THE NLRA
By the time Wagner introduced S. 1958 in the 74th Congress, the
bill that would become the National Labor Relations Act, § 2(3) of the
statute, which defines the term ‘‘employee,’’ had assumed its present
form.34 It reads, in pertinent part: ‘‘The term ‘employee’ shall include
TTT any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor
practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially
equivalent employment.’’ William Leiserson, who in 1934 had become
the first Chairman of the National Mediation Board, was among those
who submitted suggested amendments to the Senate Committee on
Education and Labor concerning the language of the proposed statute.
Leiserson also had prepared for the Committee an exhaustive analytical
comparison of the terms of the failed labor disputes bill and the language
of S. 1958. The memorandum dwelt at some length on the provisions of
§ 2(3).
Leiserson noted that some ‘‘extremely important changes’’ had been
made in the new bill’s definition of the term ‘‘employee’’ to bring within
the proposed Act’s coverage ‘‘employees whose work has ceased under
particular circumstances.’’ These changes were intended to conform the
language of the bill to existing law. Consequently, Leiserson explained,
the revisions embodied in § 2(3) included within the definition of em-
ployee ‘‘one whose work has ceased because of any unfair labor prac-
tice.’’ The new language also ensured that economic strikers would be
treated as employees and receive the Act’s protections. The language of a
previous committee draft, Leiserson pointed out, may have left economic
strikers with no protections against ‘‘interference, restraint, or coer-
cion,’’ and would likely have left them without the ‘‘protection of the act
if certain of their members, the strike leaders, for example, were discrim-
inated against in reinstatement after all had agreed to return to work on
the employer’s terms.’’ Such a result would contradict established doc-
trine. ‘‘The Textile Board TTT and the National Labor Relations Board
have both ruled that discrimination against particular strikers under the
above circumstances is a violation of the present Section 7(a).’’
Leiserson’s memorandum reviewed the case law to assure the law-
makers that the language of § 2(3) broke no new ground. The courts, he
noted, long had recognized both the legitimacy of the use of strikes as an
economic weapon and that a strike did not terminate the employer-
employee relationship. This case law, Leiserson admitted, did raise ‘‘the
problem of when a strike is ‘terminated’ or ‘lost,’ ’’ but, he continued,
34 The 1947 Taft–Hartley Amendments did not change the existing wording of § 2(3),
but did add language specifically excluding supervisors and independent contractors from
the definition of employee.
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‘‘S. 1958 provides that the labor dispute shall be ‘current,’ and the
employer is free to hasten its end by hiring a new permanent crew of
workers and running the plant on a normal basis.’’ Leiserson further
explained that:
The broader definition of ‘‘employee’’ in S. 1958 does not lead to the
conclusion that no strike may be lost or that all strikers must be
restored to their jobs, or that an employer may not hire new
workers, temporary or permanent, at will. All that is protected here
is the right of those in a current labor dispute or strike to partici-
pate in elections, to be free from discrimination in reinstatement
after they have agreed to return on the employer’s terms, to
collective bargaining, to freedom from interference, restraint, or
coercion, etc.35
Although desultory comments on various parts of the language of § 2(3)
can be found sprinkled throughout the legislative history of the Act, the
status of strikers and their reinstatement rights generated neither
discussion nor debate during the hearings over the Act. Leiserson’s
memorandum provided the Committee and Congress with the only
comprehensive and substantive review of significance of the section’s
terms.
Determined to get his legislation enacted, Senator Wagner planned
the course of his bill through the Congress with considerable care.36 In
keeping with his strategy, the hearings over the terms of S. 1958
occurred during a compact period of time—March 11 to April 2, 1935—
and took place chiefly before the Senate Labor Committee. The debate
before the full Senate over the bill’s terms absorbed only a day, and took
place on May 15, 1935. The following day, on a vote of 63 to 12, with 19
abstentions, S. 1958 was passed by the Senate. Throughout the discus-
sions on the Act’s terms, Wagner constantly reiterated that the bill
simply restated or in some cases extended concepts already established
in the law.
Wagner’s Act went to conference on June 20, 1935. A week later, the
House accepted the conference report on a 132 to 42 vote and the Senate
adopted it the same day. After some failed attempts to find a convenient
date, President Roosevelt signed the Act on Friday, July 5, 1935, using
two pens that he presented, respectively, to Senator Wagner and to
William Green, the President of the American Federation of Labor.
Congress had embedded the striker replacement problem into the terms
of the Act. A case presenting the issue would not be long in arriving.
35 1 Legislative History at 1346.
36 On Wagner’s legislative strategy and for details of the bill’s progress through the
Congress, see Irving Bernstein, The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy 100–128 (1950).
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Factual Background
In the mid-1930’s, the Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company
constituted a not insignificant presence in the international wireless
telecommunications industry. The company, a part of what was known
as the Mackay system, traced its beginnings to 1883 when John Mackay,
an Irish immigrant who had made a fortune in silver mining in the
Comstock Lode in Nevada, entered into a partnership with James
Gordon Bennett, the publisher of the New York Herald, to form a
telegraph company to compete with the transatlantic service of Western
Union Company, then controlled by Jay Gould.37 The company the two
formed began laying transatlantic cable38 and it built up its North–
American system in part by buying and merging bankrupt firms. One of
the Mackay system’s companies, Commercial Cable, also participated in
a joint-venture to lay the first transpacific telegraph cable, which became
operative in 1904.39 The Mackay-owned Postal Telegraph Company rep-
resented the Western Union Company’s only significant competitor, but
by the late 1920’s, it held only about a fifth of the domestic market for
telegraphic services.
37 Bennett’s interest in cable is easy to explain. At the time, Western Union held a
monopoly on transatlantic cable transmissions and charged $2.50 per word, making the
telegraphic transmission of news reports from Europe prohibitively expensive. At various
times, Mackay unsuccessfully attempted to gain control of its much larger rival, Western
Union and of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T). On the history of
Mackay, see Interview by Frank Polkinghorn with Ellery W. Stone, retired Vice–President
of International Telephone and Telegraph Company, IEEE History Center, Rutgers Uni-
versity, available at ¢http://www.ieee.org/organizations/history center/oral  histories/tran-
scripts/stone9.html$; Timothy W. Sturgeon, How Silicon Valley Came to Be in Under-
standing Silicon Valley: Anatomy of an Entrepreneurial Region (Martin Kenney, ed., 2000);
Robert Sobel, ITT: The Management of Opportunity, 58–61 (1982).
38 Mackay system companies eventually would lay and operate seven transatlantic
cables. A Mackay-owned cable-laying ship, the Mackay–Bennett, sailing out of Halifax,
Nova Scotia was chartered by the White Star Lines and employed in the effort to recover
bodies from the sinking of its ship, the Titanic, in April, 1912. The Mackay–Bennett’s crew
eventually retrieved the remains of 306 victims.
39 American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T), which until the 1980’s was the domi-
nant provider of telephone service in the U.S., began providing transatlantic telephone
service in 1927, and transpacific telephone service (initially between the U.S. and Japan) in
1934. Such service was carried by radio signal, its sound quality was dependent upon
atmospheric conditions, and it was quite expensive. In 1927, a transatlantic call cost $75.00
for the first three minutes. Seven years later, a call to Japan cost $39.00 for the first three
minutes. The transmission of telephone conversations by cable presents considerably
greater technical challenges than those posed by the transmission of telegraphic signals.
The first transatlantic telephone cable was not laid until 1956, while the first transpacific
telephone cable did not go into service until 1964. In 1962, AT&T launched Telstar I, the
first active communications satellite. Today, because of their lower cost and longer lifespan,
lightweight submarine fibre-optic cables largely have displaced satellites as the carriers of
communications traffic of all sorts.
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Although the telegraph industry enjoyed substantial growth
throughout the 1920’s, it was by then in the process of becoming a dated
technology, and by 1928, even the mighty Western Union Company
found itself in trouble. Rates for long distance telephone use were
declining and technical innovations had improved service. Moreover, new
devices had entered the market, like the teletypewriter that used tele-
phone lines to transmit written messages on leased equipment housed in
the customer’s own facilities, which made its debut in 1931.
Wireless communication by radio also posed a growing challenge to
communication by conventional telegraph. This was particularly true for
trans-oceanic communication, which could be accomplished by radio
without the need of expensive submarine cable.40 Guglielmo Marconi had
transmitted the first radio telegraph signals in 1895, and the first
transatlantic signals in 1901, but the radio industry remained in its
infancy until after the First World War.41 Complicated patent and
licensing arrangements for the technology made entry into the wireless
telegraphy market difficult, but by the mid-1920’s, the Mackay Radio &
Telegraph Company had been organized. Along with competitors like
Globe Wireless and the giant Radio Corporation of America (RCA),
Mackay Radio became an important provider of wireless communication
services with Pacific Rim countries.
In addition to furnishing ‘‘point-to-point’’ communications between
land-based wireless-sending facilities, like RCA, Mackay Radio also
played a prominent role in supplying wireless marine radio service.
Commercial vessels leased radio service and the equipment to provide it
from Mackay or one of its competing service providers. The equipment
was operated by the service providers’ own employees, who sailed as
radio officers on the vessels leasing the service. Mackay radios quickly
became a familiar fixture on ships, and Mackay radio officers manned
crews on vessels around the world.
By the mid-1930’s, Mackay Radio’s principal West Coast office was
in San Francisco, and it had other sending facilities in several cities
along the coast, as well as in Hawaii and Manila. These facilities
transmitted and received both telegraph and radio messages. From the
San Francisco facility, the company maintained point-to-point radio
40 Static and other technical difficulties made wireless telegraphy over land a less
financially attractive alternative to communication by conventional telegraph, as did
opposition from established telegraphic firms.
41 An almost unanticipated development, commercial radio broadcasting exploded as an
industry in the post-war period. In the U.S., the number of in-home radio receivers
increased from a mere 5,000 units in 1920 to 25 million sets only four years later, while the
number of commercial broadcasters grew from eight in 1921 to 564 the following year. A
holder of many of the key patents for this technology, RCA benefitted greatly from this
development.
29JULIUS G. GETMAN & THOMAS C. KOHLER
circuits with Los Angeles, Seattle, New York, Honolulu, Tokyo, and
Shanghai, among other cities. Despite its extensive network, however,
the Mackay system long had been in weak financial condition and by the
mid-1930’s, its corporate parent stood under considerable strain.42 Dis-
turbed by cutbacks in their working conditions and changes in employ-
ment policies, among other things, the radio operators in Mackay’s San
Francisco office quietly began a union-organizing effort in the early part
of 1934. Their efforts mirrored those undertaken by Mackay employees
at other facilities.
* * *
At about 8:30 p.m. on the evening of Friday, October 4, 1935, Leo K.
Bash, an employee of Mackay Radio and Telegraph and the acting
chairman of San Francisco Local 3 of the American Radio Telegraphists’
Association (ARTA), called to order a meeting of the organization’s
membership.43 The ARTA had initiated contract discussions with Mackay
Radio in June, hoping to obtain its first system-wide agreement with the
company.44 Bash announced to the twenty-one members in attendance
that the news was not good. Mackay’s representatives had stalled and
the Local now should be prepared to strike. During these talks, the
union acquiesced to a company request to ‘‘let the agreement slide for a
little while,’’ because the parent corporation of Mackay had been con-
templating the filing of a bankruptcy petition. In early September, the
union once again presented Mackay with contract demands, eager to
have the company agree to terms similar to those the union recently had
concluded with RCA. The Local, which represented Mackay’s San Fran-
42 Wooed by many investors during late 1920’s, Clarence Mackay, the son of the
company’s founder (and, incidentally, the father-in-law of Irving Berlin), sold the Mackay
companies to the newly-organized International Telephone and Telegraph Company
(IT&T) in 1928. A fast-expanding conglomerate, IT&T had become over-extended and was
by the mid-1930’s in rather precarious condition.
43 Unless otherwise identified, this account of the strike is drawn from the testimony
and exhibits from the hearing before the Trial Examiner contained in the Transcript of
Record in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., October Term 1937, No. 706, and the
Board’s decision, reported at 1 NLRB 201 (1936).
44 This agreement was to cover all of the land-based, or ‘‘point-to-point’’ operators in
the Mackay Radio system. In the meantime, the ARTA also had been attempting to
negotiate an agreement to apply to Mackay’s marine radio operators serving on ships at
sea. In September 1935, the marine and point-to-point operators agreed to unite for joint
action, resolving that Mackay would have to settle both agreements for either to be
effective. Local 3 had been organized in early 1934 and divided into two divisions, which
represented marine radio operators and land, or point-to-point operators respectively. The
point-to-point division itself was divided into three groups, one for the operators employed
by the three large cable and wireless companies operating on the West Coast: Mackay
Radio, Globe Wireless, and RCA. Only Local 3’s Mackay Radio group was involved in the
matter described here.
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cisco based operators, had authorized a strike against the company
should their demands not be met by September 23.45 The deadline had
passed. The men were resolute. The meeting was brief.
The job action against Mackay was to be nation-wide, and Bash told
the membership that the walk-out was scheduled to begin at midnight,
San Francisco time. After a short exchange, the members elected a strike
committee and adjourned the meeting. Many of those not in attendance
received telephone calls informing them of the situation. At the stroke of
midnight, the entire operating force on duty in Mackay’s San Francisco
office abandoned their stations and began picketing, leaving a single
supervisor to attempt to continue service. For the duration of the strike,
only three of the San Francisco office’s sixty-three operators continued
to work.
Unfortunately for the members of the San Francisco Local, and
particularly for their leadership, the solidarity they demonstrated did not
display itself nationally. The strike at Mackay’s Seattle office lasted but
a few hours, while in Los Angeles, only one radio operator left work. At
Mackay’s offices in Washington, D.C., in New Orleans, in West Palm
Beach, and in Rockville, Maine, the strike call went entirely unheeded.
In Chicago, a few operators left their stations, but their number proved
too small to have any effect on the office’s ability to handle communica-
tions traffic. Meanwhile, the operators at Mackay’s New York City office
walked out when the strike began at 3:00 a.m. on Saturday, but before
the day was out, most had returned. Portland, Oregon proved to be the
only Mackay facility where dedication to the strike matched that demon-
strated by the operators employed at the company’s San Francisco office.
According to a report published in the Sunday, October 6th edition
of The New York Times, union officials ‘‘asserted that the strike was so
effective at some stations that it had paralyzed communications across
both the Atlantic and Pacific.’’ These officials also ‘‘estimated that 200
out of 300 radio operators had walked out.’’ Service at the company’s
offices on Long Island, the union officials told the paper, was being
maintained only because supervisors were working twenty-four hours a
day, and because the company had resorted to the use of non-licensed
operators. Company officials dismissed the union’s claims as ‘‘gross
exaggerations.’’ ‘‘The strike is a washout,’’ Ellery W. Stone,46 Mackay’s
45 The union, The New York Times reported, was demanding ‘‘recognition, a contrac-
tual wage and working hours agreement, a forty-eight-hour week, and an average increase
of $24 a month for radio operators now averaging $165 a month, according to the union.’’
Radio Operators Begin Walkout: Union Asserts that Pacific and Atlantic Traffic is Para-
lyzed by its Strike, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1935, at 45.
46 Stone had been the President of the Federal Telegraph Company, the firm that had
sold Mackay rights to patents that allowed it to enter the radio telegraphy business. During
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vice president and chief negotiator told The Times. ‘‘The boys are licked
and they know itTTTT The union was all set to strike yesterday afternoon
without notice, but we were prepared for it. The men are coming back
faster than we can put them to work.’’47
Mackay was as ready for the strike as the union was unprepared to
conduct it. While Mackay’s transcontinental traffic could be maintained
by transferring San Francisco communications to its Los Angeles office,
San Francisco was crucial because it handled the company’s trans-Pacific
circuits. Desperate to keep them in service, Mackay flew two operators
from its Los Angeles office who arrived in San Francisco on the morning
of Saturday, October 5. On Monday, October 7, another plane arrived
carrying seven operators from Mackay’s New York office and two others
from its Chicago facility.
Morale remained strong among the San Francisco strikers through-
out the weekend. By Monday, however, it had started to flag. Rumors
were circulating that the company planned to abandon its circuits along
the coast; that eighty-four operators in New York had returned to work
along with seventy to eighty percent of the strikers in Portland, Oregon;
and that the plane from New York carrying more replacements soon
would arrive.
Late on Monday afternoon, a number of the strikers met informally
at the union hall where one of the operators and a supervisor, both
union members, exhorted the men to save their jobs and return to work.
Others, sensing a spreading panic, counseled against bolting from the
strike. One member, seeking to calm his fellows, plaintively observed
that the ‘‘Wagner bill’’ required the company to recognize and bargain
with the union. Supporters of the job action narrowly succeeded in
convincing the others not to abandon the strike that evening and to
postpone any decisions until the regularly scheduled morning strike
meeting.
Local 3’s leadership had planned to telephone New York late Mon-
day evening to get an update on the status of the negotiations and of the
job action on the East Coast. Several Local 3 members, including Robert
Hatch, the chief electrician for Mackay’s San Francisco facility, and
Charles Burtz, one of the radio operators, had filtered back to the union
hall to learn the latest. The news was not good, and the men listened
dispiritedly as they heard the Local’s leadership recommend to the
union’s New York negotiating team that they contact Mackay officials
an eventful career, Stone achieved the rank of Admiral in the U.S. Navy and became Vice–
President of IT&T.
47 Radio Operators Begin Walkout: Union Asserts that Pacific and Atlantic Traffic is
Paralyzed by its Strike, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1935, at 45.
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the following morning and arrange for the striking operators to return to
work pending further negotiations.
As they left the hall at about ten o’clock that evening, Hatch
dejectedly told Burtz that he believed the strike had been lost and
suggested that they call Andrew Jorgeson, the traffic manager of the
company’s San Francisco office immediately and ask to return to work.
In response to their call, Jorgeson conferred with H.L. Rodman, Mac-
kay’s general superintendent, who instructed him to reinstate the strik-
ers. ‘‘But remember,’’ he told Jorgeson, ‘‘you are to take care of the men
from New York and Los Angeles, but handle that your own way.’’ This
direction left Jorgeson with eleven extra operators should the nine
replacements from New York and Chicago and the two from Los Angeles
elect to stay in San Francisco. Uncertain how many of the group might
ultimately choose to remain, Jorgeson quickly drew up a list of eleven
strikers whom he thought the least desirable candidates for reinstate-
ment. Once the replacements had made their decisions, Jorgeson
planned to fill any remaining positions by selecting from among the
eleven on ‘‘an all things being considered’’ basis.
As arranged, Jorgeson arrived at Hatch’s apartment about half an
hour after their telephone conversation, bringing with him a list of
employee addresses and telephone numbers. He told Hatch and Burtz
that eleven of the men would have to re-apply for employment, and that
their applications would be subject to the approval of Ellery Stone at
Mackay’s headquarters in New York. Hatch and Burtz then proceeded to
contact as many of the other San Francisco operating employees as
possible, directing them to meet at a downtown hotel where Jorgeson
would explain the company’s position. Meanwhile, Jorgeson arranged for
a two-room suite in which to hold the meeting and for a police detail to
remain in discreet reserve in case the need for intervention arose. The
invitees understood that Local 3 had neither called nor sanctioned the
assembly.
At about 4:30 on the morning of Tuesday, October 8, with thirty-six
operators present, the meeting began. After some initial discussion,
Jorgeson entered the meeting from the second room of the suite. The
company, Jorgeson assured the assembly, would forget the strike and
that all but eleven of the employees could return to work. The excluded
group, he said, would have to reapply for employment, and their applica-
tions would be forwarded to New York for review by company vice-
president Stone. The names of the eleven then were read twice, and a
rather tense discussion followed.
Some among the eleven had learned of the meeting and were in
attendance, including Alonzo B. Loudermilk. One of the most active
members of Local 3, Loudermilk had played a major role in organizing
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the operators in Mackay’s San Francisco and New York offices, and he
had engaged in numerous discussions with company officials over the
operators’ terms and conditions in New York and Chicago. A strike
leader, Loudermilk also was one of the San Francisco office’s most
skilled and highly paid operators.
Loudermilk pointedly told the men that they should consider the
question on which they were about to vote in the following terms: ‘‘Are
you prepared to go back to work immediately and leave eleven men out
on a limb?’’ After some wrangling, the attendees concluded that a two-
thirds vote should decide the issue and that operators whose names
appeared on the list could cast a ballot. The results revealed twenty-two
votes to return to work, six votes against the proposal, and eight
abstentions. Loudermilk later testified that when the results were an-
nounced, Robert Hatch excitedly shouted, ‘‘Hooray! Let’s all go down
and get our names on the pay roll.’’ The meeting, and with it Local 3’s
strike against Mackay, came to a close at about 6:00 a.m. Later that day,
at one o’clock local time, the ARTA’s vice president in New York
telephoned Ellery Stone and informed him that the nationwide job action
against the company had ended.
By late Tuesday afternoon, only four of the San Francisco operators
who participated in the strike had yet to be reinstated: Leo Bash, Alonzo
Loudermilk, Glenn Palmer, and Lon Rone. All four had played important
roles in organizing the union, all had held leadership positions in Local
3, and all had figured prominently in the strike. All four also were ‘‘Class
A’’ operators and paid at the top of the company’s pay scale.
The four also were the last of the strikers to apply for reinstate-
ment. After some difficulties in gaining a meeting with H.L. Rodman,
the general superintendent of the San Francisco office, Loudermilk and
Palmer made their applications late on Tuesday, while Rone and Bash
filed their requests the following day. At the time they applied, each was
told that no vacancies then existed, but that their applications would be
forwarded to New York for Stone’s consideration. When Loudermilk
asked about his chances for approval, Rodman replied that they were not
‘‘very good,’’ and reminded him that he had ‘‘a national reputation for
causing us trouble.’’
Stone returned the applications at the end of October, noting as to
each of them that ‘‘there is no objection to favorable consideration being
given this application when a vacancy occurs at San Francisco.’’ Jorge-
son told one of the men that he did not believe any openings would exist
until the following summer. At the time the NLRB issued its decision in
the case in February 1936, none of the men had been reinstated.
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Prior Proceedings
1. CONSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY AND STATUTORY NOVELTY:
THE NEW NLRB AND ITS INAUGURAL CASES
The ARTA filed charges against Mackay Radio on October 15, 1935,
and the Board’s regional office in San Francisco issued a complaint on
November 9, alleging that the company’s refusal to reinstate the four
operators, as well as the manager of its downtown branch office,48
constituted violations of §§ 8(1) and (3) of the Act.49 In considering
Mackay, it helps to keep in mind the context in which the case arose.
Mackay was among the first matters that the fledgling NLRB handled.
At the time the Board tried and argued it, the Agency’s procedures were
novel and untested and every decision the Board issued made new law.
When regarded from the perspective of an observer in 1935, neither the
prospects for the Act’s passage nor for its survival at the hands of the
Supreme Court exactly appeared to be lead-pipe cinches.
To begin with, the Roosevelt Administration did not regard the
Wagner Act as a central part of its New Deal programs.50 Despite appeals
by Senator Wagner and the AFL, Roosevelt had declined to back the
NLRA in Congress and did so only at the very last moment, when
developments gave him little other choice. Frances Perkins, his Secretary
of Labor, also showed at best a cool detachment toward the bill. The
statute owed its existence to Wagner’s stubborn determination to get it
passed, and not to any prestige or support lent by the Administration. A
contemporary observer summed up the situation by noting that ‘‘We
who believed in the Act were dizzy with watching a 200–to–1 shot come
up from the outside.’’51
48 The manager, P.D. Phelps, was a member of the union but not an activist. The
Board would conclude that the company discriminated against Phelps by refusing to
reinstate him based in part on the admission of the general superintendent that ‘‘we did
not approve of a commercial man, in charge of an office, becoming a member of an
organization such as ARTA.’’
49 The complaint also alleged a violation of Section 8(2), which the Board dismissed.
50 For President Roosevelt, labor law reform was never a priority among his New Deal
initiatives. Moreover, he feared that labor legislation would incur Supreme Court chal-
lenges and also threaten his coalition with business interests necessary to support his
agenda of social and economic legislation. The information in the following paragraphs
about the early days of the NLRB are drawn from accounts and quotations in Peter H.
Irons, The New Deal Lawyers, 203–53 (1982); James A. Gross, 1 The Making of the
National Labor Relations Board: A Study in Economics, Politics, and the Law (1933–1937),
109–88 (1974); and Irving Bernstein, The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy 84–128
(1950).
51 Malcolm Ross, Death of a Yale Man 170 (1939), quoted in Irving Bernstein, The New
Deal Collective Bargaining Policy 1 (1950).
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The executive branch’s lukewarm attitude toward the statute did
not represent its only source of difficulty. Less than a month before
Congress acted on the NLRA, the Supreme Court decided Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States,52 which cast grave doubt in the minds of
many on the constitutionality of the proposed Act’s terms. The case
hung like a pall over the NLRA both during its consideration by
Congress and during the period between its passage and the Court’s
declaration of its constitutionality two years later in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.53 Wagner and his legislative assistants were forced
to redraft portions of the statute to respond to concerns raised by
Schechter, and, especially during the first year of the Act’s existence, the
Board spent many of its resources litigating employer requests for
injunctions to restrain the agency from enforcing its terms. It is one of
history’s little ironies that Schechter, actually may have assisted the
Act’s passage. The case permitted congressional opponents of the NLRA
quietly to drop their opposition to it, thereby allowing them to gain
credit with constituents who supported the statute while being privately
convinced that the Court would void the law at the first opportunity.
The widespread belief that the Court would find the Act’s terms
unconstitutional also made it difficult to find individuals willing to serve
as members of the new NLRB. Nearly two months passed between the
signing of the Act and the Senate’s confirmation of the first three NLRB
members who would make initial rulings under the new law. Confirmed
on August 24th, the new members assumed their offices three days later.
52 295 U.S. 495 (1935). (In Schechter, the Court invalidated the terms of the NIRA,
ruling in part that the application of the Act to intrastate activities exceeded the powers of
Congress under the commerce clause. Schechter involved convictions for violation of the
wage, hour, and trade practice regulations contained in the Code of Fair Competition for
the Live Poultry Industry for the New York City metropolitan area, which had been
promulgated pursuant to the terms of the NIRA. The Court concluded that Schechter’s
business, which involved the slaughter and sale of poultry to retailers and butcher shops in
New York City, did not constitute interstate commerce even though nearly all the poultry
Schechter handled came from out-of-state. Rejecting ‘‘stream of commerce’’ and ‘‘affecting
commerce’’ arguments, the Court, through Chief Justice Hughes, stated that the interstate
character of the transactions ended when the live poultry reached Schechter’s slaughter-
house. Neither the slaughtering nor the subsequent sale of the poultry, the Court stated,
were transactions in interstate commerce. To accept the argument that hours and wages
affect prices and commerce generally, Justice Hughes warned, would allow Congress to
reach nearly all aspects of business transactions. The Court dismissed arguments that
‘‘efforts to enact state legislation establishing high labor standards have been impeded by
the belief that unless similar action is taken generally, commerce will be diverted’’ to states
without such regulation. ‘‘It is not the province of the Court to consider the economic
advantages or disadvantages of such a centralized system,’’ Hughes wrote, and the
‘‘Federal Constitution does not provide for it.’’ A year later, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238 (1936), the Court invalidated the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935,
which established a scheme for wage and hour regulation in mining.)
53 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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Commenting on their appointments, Business Week magazine observed
that ‘‘the feeling is that the President had to hunt a long time and drop
down below the upper bracket to find anyone who would take a chance,
the past history of labor boards being what it is.’’ The three willing to
take the risk were J. Warren Madden, a law professor from the Universi-
ty of Pittsburgh, who became the Chairman; John M. Carmody, an
industrial engineer who at the time of his appointment was a member of
the National Mediation Board; and Edwin S. Smith, a holdover from the
old NLRB, who soon would become a highly controversial figure.
They were a diverse lot. A torts and property teacher, Madden came
to the Board with scant experience in labor relations. A series of chance
connections brought him to the Administration’s attention as a candi-
date for the position. In 1933, the Governor of Pennsylvania, Gifford
Pinchot, appointed Madden to a commission to study the use of private
police forces by coal and steel companies. There, Madden became well-
acquainted with Francis Biddle, a Philadelphia corporate law specialist
who in late 1934 became Chairman of the old NLRB. Biddle, in turn, had
been recruited for the Board position by his predecessor, Lloyd K.
Garrison, who, eager to return to academic life, had told Roosevelt that
he would serve in the post no longer than four months. Madden had
developed a friendly relationship with Garrison during the summer of
1933 when they served as visiting faculty at Stanford Law School.
Madden’s third recommender was Charlton Ogburn, counsel for the
AFL, who had been impressed with Madden when he arbitrated a wage
dispute for the Pittsburgh street railway. During his pre-appointment
interview with Frances Perkins, Madden rather disarmingly confessed
that he ‘‘just didn’t know anything about labor law’’ or ‘‘anything really
about this board and the statute.’’ Perkins was unfazed. ‘‘Well, that is
fine,’’ she reassuringly replied. ‘‘You will not have any preconceptions
about it and you can just start it from the ground up and learn it as you
go.’’
Despite his slim labor relations background, Madden quickly estab-
lished himself as the intellectual and moral leader of the Board. Nathan
Witt, a Frankfurter prote´ge´ and an assistant to Charles Fahy, the
Board’s first General Counsel, characterized Madden as ‘‘basically a
conservative man TTT certainly a liberal as far as civil liberties are
concerned and certainly a conservative as far as basic economic issues
are concerned.’’ Madden would remain Chairman until 1940, guiding the
Agency through some of its most dramatic and tumultuous years.
Carmody’s appointment came at the recommendation of Senator
Wagner, who described him ‘‘as a solid man who had his feet on the
ground and had a lot of experience in labor relations.’’ Prior to his
service on the National Mediation Board, Carmody had chaired the
National Bituminous Coal Labor Board under the NIRA and served as
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chief engineer of the Civil Works Administration. Committed to media-
tion rather than litigation, Carmody quickly became frustrated with
‘‘what he regarded as a lot of legal rigmarole.’’ Witt described Carmody
as ‘‘impatient’’ with legal issues and said that he ‘‘just wasn’t the kind
of personality who belonged on the Board.’’ Evidently, Carmody agreed.
He participated in the Board’s Mackay decision, but resigned his post
after a year and took an appointment with the Rural Electrification
Administration.
The third member of the Board, Edwin Smith, was the sole holdover
from the old NLRB. Like Carmody, he was not a lawyer, but unlike him,
Smith enjoyed discussing legal issues and litigation strategy. Smith’s
positions and his ‘‘intemperate, radical, public utterances’’ quickly made
him the Board’s most controversial member and served to instigate
considerable criticism of the Agency and its rulings, especially from the
business community. Madden much later told an interviewer that Smith
‘‘quite certainly was a communist,’’ although subsequent congressional
investigations failed to substantiate such charges.
The new NLRB assumed the staffs and regional offices that the old
NLRB had assembled. This, however, did not leave the new agency fully
prepared to undertake its tasks under the NLRA. The old NLRB’s
regional staffs spent much of their time investigating and mediating
disputes. In contrast, Congress intended the new agency to fulfill its now
familiar prosecutorial and quasi-judicial roles. As of September 1, 1935,
the agency had only thirteen lawyers in the Washington, D.C. office, and
only one assigned to any of the Board’s regional offices. Nathan Witt
noted that the Board encountered ‘‘a hell of a time building up staff and
getting qualified people’’ because potential applicants were ‘‘convinced
that [the Board would] be put out of business by the Supreme Court’’
and because the pay scale was low. Fahy delegated the recruiting and
hiring of lawyers to Witt and to Thomas Emerson, another Frankfurter
prote´ge´ who later would become a law professor at Yale and one of the
best-known civil rights lawyers of his era. Both Witt and Emerson had
served on the staff of the old NLRB.
By October 14, 1935, sufficient staff had been assembled to permit
Fahy to direct his lawyers to ‘‘start sending in their cases.’’ To assist the
regional offices in getting established, nearly all of the Board’s Washing-
ton legal staff had been dispersed to the field. In conducting their work,
Nathan Witt later explained, ‘‘we were under special instructions to look
for test cases, since we knew that we were headed for the Supreme
Court.’’ Circumstances provided them with much from which to choose.
By March 1936, the Board had handled 729 cases involving 165,792
employees.
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Until January 1936, the Board prohibited regional directors from
issuing a complaint in any matter until the General Counsel’s office had
reviewed and approved it. The Board also took care in timing the
issuance of its decisions. Benedict Wolf, the Board’s Secretary, justified
the policy to a frustrated regional director. ‘‘The delay in issuing
decisions,’’ he explained, ‘‘is not caused solely by the inability to issue
them at a particular time. It was extremely important that the Board be
able to control to some extent the test cases which would first get to the
Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court.’’ It is better to contend with the
parties’ restiveness, Wolf continued, than to have the Board ‘‘find itself
in the Supreme Court with a case which is not particularly strong on
interstate commerce and involves a company so small that the courts
would be disinclined to believe that company’s business could possibly
affect interstate commerce.’’
2. MACKAY RADIO AS SUPREME COURT LITIGATION
VEHICLE: THE BOARD’S DECISION
Because it so clearly involved interstate commerce, the Mackay case
quickly came to the Board’s attention. A complaint in the matter issued
on November 9, 1935, and the Board conducted hearings in San Francis-
co before a trial examiner from the second to the twentieth of December.
The day before the hearings concluded, the Board, on its own motion,
transferred the proceedings to itself. Several weeks later, on February
20, 1936, the Board issued its decision in Mackay. Within days, the
Board filed a petition for enforcement of its order with the Ninth Circuit
and the court set the case for argument on April 16.
The Board’s decision in Mackay was straightforward—the company
had discriminated against the employees named in the complaint. The
Board ordered their reinstatement with backpay. In so doing, it dis-
missed the company’s contentions that the employees had not been
reinstated because their positions were no longer available, having been
filled by replacements brought by the company to San Francisco from
other locations. The replacements, the Board observed, ‘‘were really
strikebreakers.’’ The company ‘‘is therefore contending that such strike-
breakers are entitled to the four positions in question in preference to
the men who held them at the time the strike had commenced and who
because of union activity had temporarily severed their active work on
those jobs but not their status as employees.’’ ‘‘It might be argued by
these four operators,’’ the Board admitted, ‘‘that the granting of such a
preference to the strikebreakers’’ constituted forbidden discrimination.
‘‘However,’’ the Board continued, ‘‘since we find that a decision on the
point is not necessary to the final judgment in this case, we will not
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decide the matter.’’54
In defending itself against the charge of discrimination, the company
asserted that it was completely fortuitous that the only four operators
not reinstated happened to be union leaders. The four simply were the
last to apply for reinstatement, and they did so after all the positions had
been filled. The results would have been different, the company insisted,
had they been among the first to request reinstatement.
‘‘The difficulty with this contention,’’ the Board stated, ‘‘is that it
was the respondent who chose the standard of time.’’ Moreover, the
company ‘‘chose that standard on Tuesday afternoon at a time when the
four leaders had not as yet reapplied but it deliberately shifted to that
standard at that point.’’ Jorgeson himself, the Board noted, had testified
that the reinstatement of the employees named on the list ‘‘was not to
be a case of ‘first come, first served.’ ’’ Instead, ‘‘Jorgeson and not time
was to do the selecting.’’ The company only shifted to that standard ‘‘on
Tuesday afternoon coincident with the realization that the full quota had
been reached’’ and the union leaders had not yet formally applied for
reinstatement. Company officials, the Board concluded, ‘‘perceived that
circumstances had provided them with an excellent opportunity to rid
the respondent of the leaders of the Local which had just caused it to
pass through a costly strike, and it did not fail to make the most of the
opportunity.’’ By taking advantage of that chance, the Board ruled, the
company violated the Act.
Additionally, the company had induced each of the four to under-
stand that he would not be reinstated. Believing that they were blacklist-
ed, the Board found that it was not surprising that the four ‘‘would delay
their request for reinstatement.’’ In these circumstances, the application
of a ‘‘first come, first served’’ principle to determine reinstatements
constituted a violation of the statute.
The exquisite care with which the Board handled Mackay and the
lengths to which it went in explaining its reasoning reflect the value the
Agency put on the case as a means for testing the constitutionality of the
Act. As the reader will have noticed, however, the point for which we
know Mackay—the right it grants employers permanently to replace
strikers—represents an issue the Board specifically declined to address.
Rather, it treated the case as a discrimination matter. So, how did the
issue of an employer’s right to respond to an economic strike find its way
into the Supreme Court’s opinion in Mackay?
3. THE BEST LAID PLANS: FRUSTRATION BEFORE THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Although the Ninth Circuit heard the case in mid-April 1936, it did
not render its decision denying enforcement of the Board’s order until
54 1 NLRB at 216.
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the following January. This confounded an assessment made by General
Counsel Charles Fahy who, in deciding to proceed with the case, thought
that the court would not ‘‘unreasonably delay this decision,’’ thereby
allowing it quickly to reach the Supreme Court.55
The three deeply divergent and at times confusing opinions the
Ninth Circuit eventually produced may explain why deliberations in
Mackay dragged on so long.56 Judge Curtis D. Wilbur, who had presided
as the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court and as the Secre-
tary of the Navy under Calvin Coolidge, wrote the lead opinion. He
found that the Act was not wholly unconstitutional and that the strikers
were employees for the purposes of the statute. Nevertheless, relying on
Adair v. United States57 and Coppage v. Kansas,58 he concluded that the
order to reinstate them violated the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment because it required the company to employ persons with
whom it chose not to deal, thereby interfering with the employer’s
constitutionally-protected freedom of contract. Wilbur also found that
the Act offended the guarantees of the Seventh Amendment insofar as it
authorized the Board to assess damages without a jury trial.
Judge Clifton Mathews, a Roosevelt appointee to the Ninth Circuit,
concurred in the result. However, unlike Wilbur, he concluded that the
Board had not shown that the strikers were employees within the
meaning of the Act. In Mathews’ view, the discriminatees had not been
discharged through the company’s failure to reinstate them. Instead, he
found that they had quit their jobs voluntarily when they went out on
strike. In light of this, he found it unnecessary to consider Mackay’s
contention that the § 2(3) definition of employee as including strikers
was unconstitutional or to make any rulings on the additional constitu-
tional issues raised by the company.
Another Roosevelt appointee, Francis A. Garrecht, dissented. Noting
that many lower courts and some of the circuit courts of appeals had
sustained the constitutionality of the Act, he stated that ‘‘it cannot be
said that there exists between the Constitution and this law and beyond
all reasonable doubt a clear and unmistakable conflict.’’ He also disa-
greed with Mathews’ view that the strikers were not employees for the
purposes of the Act. ‘‘[T]o reach such a conclusion,’’ he said of Mathews’
construction of § 2(3) of the statute, ‘‘is to ignore the declaration of the
act itself that employees on a strike are to be considered still as
employees.’’ Congress had the power under the commerce clause to pass
55 Peter H. Irons, The New Deal Lawyers 263 (1982).
56 Reported at 87 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1937).
57 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
58 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
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the Act, Garrecht wrote, and nothing in the Board’s actions or its order
in Mackay offended the Constitution.
In mid-April 1937, a few months after the Ninth Circuit decided
Mackay, the Supreme Court handed down its landmark decision in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., in which it upheld the constitu-
tionality of the NLRA.59 The Ninth Circuit granted the Board’s petition
for rehearing in Mackay, but in a decision issued in October, the court
again refused enforcement of the Board’s order. Judges Mathews and
Garrecht adhered to the views they previously had expressed. In his
opinion, however, Judge Wilbur retreated from his conclusion that
strikers retained their status as employees under the Act. He now
asserted that the Constitution permitted the Board to order reinstate-
ment of employees only when they had ceased work by reason of an
unfair labor practice. Employees who voluntarily went on strike quit
their positions, and consistent with the constitutionally-protected liberty
of contract, Congress has no power to compel parties to enter into new
contracts of employment. Accordingly, he ruled, the Board lacked the
power to order the reinstatement of the Mackay strikers. This view of
the Act, Judge Garrecht retorted in his dissent, represented ‘‘a strained
construction designed to nullify the National Labor Relations Act in an
important field of its operations.’’
The Board agreed with Judge Garrecht’s characterization of the
matter. As it argued in seeking a writ of certiorari in Mackay, the NLRB,
as well as its predecessors, ‘‘have uniformly ruled that discrimination in
reinstatement of striking employees must be remedied by restoring the
victims to their jobs.’’60
The Supreme Court Decision
Because it had languished on appeal, Mackay was not among the
first cases employed by the Board to test the Act’s constitutionality.
Nevertheless, Mackay involved critically important issues concerning the
Board’s remedial powers. The Supreme Court granted the Board’s peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari in February 1938, and heard arguments in
early April. The following month, it handed down its opinion.
Charles Fahy, the Board’s general counsel and its chief legal tacti-
cian, participated in briefing and arguing the case before the Court. Fahy
came to the Board in August 1935 from the Department of the Interior,
where he had served as Chairman of the NIRA-established Petroleum
Administrative Board. He was recommended for the post by Calvert
59 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
60 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit at 25–26, NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (No.
37–706).
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Magruder, the general counsel of the old NLRB, who had been eager to
leave Washington to resume his position at Harvard Law School. Stanley
Surrey, a young Board lawyer who later would become a leading tax law
scholar and law professor at Harvard, characterized Fahy as ‘‘liberal in a
rugged, fundamentalist sense, a very cautious lawyer, a very careful and
methodical type.’’ Fahy and Board Chairman J. Warren Madden became
close friends, and one Board lawyer later stated that Madden ‘‘was
certainly more swayed by Charlie Fahy’s views than that of any other
single person.’’ Like Madden, Fahy remained at the Board during its
first five years, and was responsible for shaping the Agency’s crucial
litigation strategy. He later served as Solicitor General and as a member
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.61
As framed by the Board, Mackay presented the Court with several
issues: whether economic strikers are employees within the meaning of
the Act; whether discrimination in reinstatement of economic strikers
because of their union activities constitutes an unfair labor practice, and
whether the Act authorizes the Board to order the reinstatement of such
discriminatees; and finally, whether the Act, construed to permit the
Board to order reinstatements, violates the Fifth Amendment. In addi-
tion, Mackay contended that the evidence did not support the Board’s
factual findings, and its petition for review was not timely filed.
In a terse and business-like opinion, Justice Owen Roberts, writing
for a unanimous Court, quickly disposed of all of Mackay’s jurisdictional
arguments and its objections to the Board’s decision. Holding that ‘‘the
Board’s order is within its competence and does not contravene any
provision of the Constitution,’’ the Court ruled in the Agency’s favor on
all the issues it raised on appeal.62
The language in Mackay best known to us appears in a portion of
the decision where the Court answers the company’s contention that
because it had not committed any unfair labor practices, the Board
lacked jurisdiction in the case altogether. The Court started with a quote
from § 8(3) and then proceeded with a serial review of the events leading
up to the charge of discrimination. ‘‘There is no evidence and no
finding,’’ the Court said, ‘‘of any unfair labor practice in connection with
the negotiations in New York.’’ Rather, the company did negotiate with
representatives of the union. ‘‘Nor,’’ the opinion continued, ‘‘was it an
unfair labor practice to replace the striking employees with others in an
effort to carry on the business.’’ Noting that § 13 of the Act provides
61 See Peter H. Irons, The New Deal Lawyers 234, 235 (1982); James A. Gross, 1 The
Making of the National Labor Relations Board: A Study in Economics, Politics, and the
Law (1933–1937), 170–71 (1974).
62 304 U.S. at 343.
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that nothing in the statute should be construed to impede or diminish
the right to strike, the Court stated that:
it does not follow that an employer, guilty of no act denounced by
the statute, has lost the right to protect and continue his business
by supplying places left vacant by strikers. And he is not bound to
discharge those hired to fill the places of strikers, upon the election
of the latter to resume their employment, in order to create places
for them. The assurance by respondent to those who accepted
employment during the strike that if they so desired their places
might be permanent was not an unfair labor practice nor was it such
to reinstate only so many of the strikers as there were vacant places
to be filled.63
In contrast, the Court observed that Mackay had engaged in unlawful
discrimination by refusing to reinstate certain strikers on the basis of
their union activity. Because strikers retain the status of employees,
‘‘[a]ny such discrimination in putting them back to work is, therefore,
prohibited’’ by the Act.
It is noteworthy that in denying reinstatement rights to strikers, the
Court ignores the language of both § 2(3), which defines employees as
including strikers, and § 13, which states that nothing in the Act ‘‘shall
be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any
way the right to strike.’’ Additionally, the Court does not analyze the
employer’s conduct in terms of the unfair labor practice provisions of the
Act. Instead it simply restates doctrines developed by common law courts
and adopted by the NLRB’s predecessor labor boards.
It is true that the Board itself did not reach the question of whether
an employer engages in unlawful discrimination by permanently replac-
ing strikers. The Board, however, conceded the point in its reply brief. In
answering Mackay’s assertion that the Agency’s construction of the Act
‘‘guarantees the striker his job whenever he wants it,’’ the Board
responded that the company’s ‘‘argument rests upon a gross misstate-
ment of the Board’s position and the issues involved here.’’ ‘‘The
Board,’’ the brief declared,
has never contended, in this case or any other, that an employer
who has neither caused nor prolonged a strike through unfair labor
practices, cannot take full advantage of economic forces working for
his victory in a labor dispute. The Act clearly does not forbid him, in
the absence of such unfair labor practices, to replace the striking
employees with new employees or authorize an order directing that
63 Id. at 345–46, citing NLRB v. Bell Oil & Gas Co., 91 F.2d 509 (1937).
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all the strikers be reinstated and new employees discharged. Admit-
tedly the strikers are not ‘‘guaranteed’’ reinstatement by the Act.64
As the Board further noted, citing several recent cases that had been
enforced by various circuit courts, where a ‘‘strike is not caused by an
unfair labor practice, but where, during the strike, the employer com-
mits an unfair labor practice,’’ the Board has ordered reinstatement
‘‘only to the extent that the strikers had not been replaced at the time of
the unfair labor practice.’’ The other replaced strikers are placed on a
preferential hiring list, and ‘‘the employer is not required to discharge
any new employees hired prior to the commission’’ of the unlawful act.
The Supreme Court’s Mackay opinion squared on all fours with the
Board’s argument in the case, and it authoritatively restated for the law
under the NLRA the doctrine governing the rights of economic strikers
that common law courts and earlier labor boards had developed. It is also
entirely consistent with the typically restrained approach taken by
Madden and Fahy to the construction of the Act, an approach dictated
not only by attitudes of lawyerly caution and reticence that characterized
both men, but by a deeply shared concern that an assertive reading and
application of the statute would provoke the Court into finding it
unconstitutional. It also is consistent with the intent of the drafters of
the Act insofar as such intent can be divined from William Leiserson’s
analytical memorandum that compared the terms of Wagner’s failed
1934 labor disputes bill with the provisions of the NLRA. Nevertheless,
does an employer’s ability to grant permanent status to replacements
discriminate against strikers by discouraging employees from engaging
in protected activities? Does the Mackay doctrine actually undermine the
collective bargaining system its framers intended to establish through
the Act?
The Impact of Mackay
REEVALUATING THE MACKAY DOCTRINE
The Mackay doctrine was not a judicial effort to minimize the pro-
labor goals of the original Wagner Act. It was, in fact, consistent with the
law as understood by its framers, by the Board and by organized labor
itself. The goal of the law was to promote free collective bargaining and
all of the major players understood collective bargaining to be a system
of private ordering in which the government’s role would be minimal.
The natural play of economic forces would regulate its operation and
limit the extent to which either side could ignore the interests of the
other. Both labor and management wanted to avoid a system in which
the state and political actors chose collective bargaining outcomes. The
64 Reply Brief for NLRB at 15, NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333
(1938) (No. 37–706).
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state was to provide a framework for private ordering, but not the
substance of that order.
State intervention was thought to be the opponent of free collective
bargaining. Thus, Mary van Kleeck, a leading industrial relations scholar
and a strong proponent of collective bargaining, opposed Wagner’s 1934
labor disputes bill. She thought attempts to equalize the bargaining
power of the parties were doomed to failure, and she presciently feared
that government intervention into the process of collective bargaining
would lead to the regulation of unions.65
Of course, collective bargaining under the Act never was intended to
be entirely a laissez-faire system. State regulation was understood as
necessary to protect the integrity of the system. It was obvious that the
goal of protecting the integrity of the bargaining process without influ-
encing its substantive results presented the Board and the courts with a
difficult and subtle task. But it was not surprising that they concluded
that the employer’s ability to hire permanent replacements did not
threaten the basic integrity of the system.
The basic rights of workers were protected by the definition of
unfair labor practices in the Act. The section of the Act that was
intended to protect job rights of union workers was § 8(3), which was
violated only when the employer engaged in ‘‘discrimination TTT to
discourage union membership.’’ The language was far from self-explana-
tory, but to make out a violation of its terms, it seemed to require that
the employer treat union members and supporters differently from other
employees and that it do so for the purpose of discouraging union
membership. Neither of these conditions was obviously met in the hiring
of replacements. The employer in Mackay was seeking to continue its
business, not discourage union membership. And as already noted,
Mackay was decided at a time when even minor limitations on an
employer’s right to hire and fire were thought to stretch the limits of
government power.
It was not as if unions lacked effective techniques for making the
hiring of permanent replacements costly. In basic industries unions were
strong and both sides understood that they would become stronger. This
gave employers a strong motive for avoiding no-holds-barred battles. The
Act did not prevent unions from coming to the support of each other.
Hiring permanent replacements not only meant the loss of top quality
union workers but it was likely to prolong and spread the scope of a
strike. It was also bound to lead to at least minor acts of violence and
prolonged antipathy from those not replaced. And if the strike was
caused by an unfair labor practice, something often difficult to deter-
mine, the workers would be reinstated with back pay by the Board.
65 See Irving Bernstein, The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy 67 (1950).
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Thus in the presence of a strong labor movement with a broad right
to strike one might conclude that using permanent replacements would
be an employer threat but not a major feature of collective bargaining.
And for many years this was true. But the National Labor Relations Act
and reality have both changed significantly since the Mackay doctrine
was first announced and today it constitutes an anomaly in the law, an
invitation to employers to bargain in bad faith, and a danger to workers
and unions.
MACKAY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NLRA
By the mid 1960’s, the Mackay doctrine had become obviously
inconsistent with the interpretation of § 8(a)(3) developed by the Board
and the courts. Very early on, the Supreme Court announced two
important basic principles about the goal of the section. First, it articu-
lated the policy of free choice that lay behind the language of the
subsection—‘‘to allow employees to freely exercise their right to join
unions, be good, bad, or indifferent members, or abstain from joining any
union without imperiling their livelihood.’’66 Second, it held that to
‘‘encourage or discourage membership’’ as used in the Act means also to
encourage or discourage participation in union activities or fulfillment of
union obligations.67
Similarly, the Court, early in the Act’s development, made clear that
discrimination could occur even when an employer did not treat union
members and non-union members differently. The key case was Republic
Aviation v. NLRB,68 in which employees were discharged for violating a
company rule against solicitation. The company argued that it did not
discriminate against union members because it would have discharged
any employee who violated its rule for whatever purpose. The Court
rejected the argument, and in effect concluded that the discrimination
consisted of treating these employees differently from the way the
company would have treated them had they not engaged in union
solicitation.69
The key issue in developing a consistent theory of § 8(a)(3), howev-
er, was whether the section required that the employer act for the
specific purpose of discouraging union membership or activity. Although
most cases alleging violations of § 8(a)(3) claim that employers have
acted to discourage union activity, the first full discussion by the Court
66 Radio Officers’ Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954).
67 Id. at 39–42.
68 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
69 For analysis of this position, see Julius Getman, Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the
Effort to Insulate Free Employee Choice, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 735 (1965).
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of the requirement of motive under § 8(a)(3) was in Radio Officers’
Union v. NLRB,70 where one of the consolidated cases alleged that an
employer had reduced an employee’s seniority for his failure to pay
union dues, thereby acting to encourage union membership. The Court
rejected the employer’s defense that it had no purpose to encourage
union membership. Although the Court reaffirmed the requirement of
proof of motive and quoted approvingly from statements made in other
contexts concerning the importance of motive, it said that no proof of
specific intent was required where ‘‘employer conduct inherently encour-
ages or discourages union membership.’’ It approved the position of the
NLRB and the appellate courts that had found that proof of ‘‘certain
types of discrimination satisfies the intent requirement.’’ Unfortunately,
the basis for the Court’s holding was not made clear.
The Court’s language was bound to lead to confusion in subsequent
cases. The Radio Officers’ decision was cited both for the proposition
that a finding of improper motive is necessary under § 8(a)(3) and for
the proposition that it is not. The Court largely cleared up the confusion
in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.,71 in which it upheld the Board’s
determination that the grant of superseniority to strike replacements
violated § 8(a)(3). The employer argued, inter alia, that because it was
not motivated by a desire to discourage union membership, its action
was privileged. The Court rejected this argument in language which
foretold the end of any motive requirement under the section.
[A]s often happens, the employer may counter by claiming that his
actions were taken in the pursuit of legitimate business ends and
that his dominant purpose was not to discriminate or to invade
union rights but to accomplish business objectives acceptable under
the Act. TTT [W]hatever the claimed overriding justification may be,
[the employer’s conduct] TTT carries with it unavoidable conse-
quences which the employer not only foresaw but which he must
have intended. As is not uncommon in human experience, such
situations present a complex of motives and preferring one motive to
another is in reality the far more delicate task, reflected in part in
decisions of this Court, of weighing the interests of employees in
concerted activity against the interest of the employer in operating
his business in a particular manner and of balancing in the light of
the Act and its policy the intended consequences upon employee
rights against the business ends to be served by the employer’s
conduct. This essentially is the teaching of the Court’s prior cases.72
70 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
71 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
72 Id. at 228–30.
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The Court in Erie Resistor summed up its conclusion in language
which would have been at least equally applicable had it been analyzing
the legitimacy of hiring permanent replacements: ‘‘[S]uper-seniority by
its very terms operates to discriminate between strikers and nonstrikers,
both during and after a strike, and its destructive impact upon the strike
and union activity cannot be doubted.’’73
The Court reaffirmed the conclusion that impact alone may justify a
finding of violation in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.74 In that case,
the employer granted vacation pay to non-strikers but not to strikers.
The employer argued that it was motivated by business concerns in so
doing, not the desire to punish employees who engaged in concerted
activity. The Court rejected this argument because the action was
inherently destructive of the employees’ rights under the statute.
The same method of analysis was subsequently used to conclude
that replaced strikers are entitled to reinstatement when the employer
increases its workforce after a strike.75 And in Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB76
the Court refused to review the Board’s conclusion that replaced eco-
nomic strikers are entitled to priority in rehiring. Thus, the application
of § 8(a)(3) today involves balancing employer rights and interests
against the impact of the employer’s conduct on employee statutory
rights.
The law has changed significantly since the time that Congress
framed the Act and the Court announced its decision in Mackay. Union
economic pressure then unregulated is now subject to severe and com-
plex regulation. The passage of the Taft–Hartley77 and Landrum–Griffin
amendments78 seriously restrict the ability of unions to call upon one
another for assistance in putting economic pressure on an employer or in
making common cause to improve workers’ terms and conditions gener-
ally. When it outlawed secondary activity by unions Congress significant-
ly altered the balance of power between labor and management—the
73 Although Justice White, who wrote the opinion in Erie Resistor, emphasized balanc-
ing, he recognized that motive plays an important role in the balancing process. The basic
premise of the opinion is that existence of a legitimate business purpose, though relevant,
is not necessarily dispositive if achieving such purpose would require serious interference
with union rights. Moreover, as the opinion makes clear, if an employer is motivated by
anti-union animus his action will be held to violate § 8(a)(3) even though it serves a valid
business purpose and would otherwise have been permissible.
74 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
75 NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
76 397 U.S. 920 (1970), declining to review, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969).
77 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
78 Pub. L. No. 86–257 (1959).
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balance that made the Mackay decision acceptable to labor and its
supporters.
The Continuing Importance of Mackay
MACKAY’S IMPACT ON FREEDOM OF CHOICE
The Mackay doctrine gives employers a powerful argument against
unionization. In almost every union organizing election conducted by the
NLRB, the employer mounts a campaign against representation in which
it makes two points. Firstly, it will emphasize that it will bargain hard in
the event of unionization, and that the only way for the union to force it
to give benefits is through the strike. Secondly, the employer will point
out that in the event of a strike, it has the right—which it is likely to
use—permanently to replace the strikers. This is an argument that
many employees interested in unions would be well advised to take
seriously.
In addition, the hiring of replacement workers will often mean and
will always threaten the termination of the union representation desired
by the replaced employees. Under the Act, the replacement workers will
be able to vote in a decertification election on whether they wish to
continue representation. Such elections almost always lead to union
decertification. Mackay thus provides employers with an incentive to
seek a strike as a union-avoidance technique. There is reason to believe
that this tactic was widely employed during the 1980’s in several major
industries, papermaking in particular.
MACKAY AND UNION POWER
The Supreme Court intimated in Mackay that employers need the
right to permanently replace employees in order to continue operations
during a strike. If that were ever true, it is no longer. The ability of
employers in general to cope with a strike without hiring permanent
replacements has significantly improved since the time of the Mackay
decision.79 The weakened state of the labor movement has made strike
breaking more socially acceptable so that temporary replacements are
easier to obtain. Provisions of the Act outlawing secondary union activity
79 Contemporary commentators are not unanimous on how or, in some cases, whether
the Mackay rule should be modified. For one proposal that also summarizes other
positions, see Samuel Estreicher, Collective Bargaining or ‘‘Collective Begging’’?: Reflec-
tions on Antistrikebreaker Legislation, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 577 (1994). Professor Estreicher
suggests that employers must in some circumstances have an opportunity to replace
strikers to provide ‘‘a market-based check on unreasonable union demands at the bargain-
ing table.’’ Id. at 599. He, however, proposes that employers be permitted to use perma-
nent replacements after a strike has continued for more than six months and an employer
can demonstrate business necessity. For a sense of the debate among economists over
whether the holding of Mackay is efficient, see Seth D. Harris, Coase’s Paradox and the
Inefficiency of Permanent Strike Replacements, 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 1185 (2002).
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and increased automation have all weakened the position of unions in
economic strikes. There are now companies that specialize in providing
replacement workers temporarily or permanently to struck companies.
The policies favoring free collective bargaining and freedom of choice
are overlapping and mutually dependent. Successful collective bargaining
is the culmination of the decision to unionize, and employees must feel
free to support the union for collective bargaining to be successful. That
employees who participate in the process in the manner contemplated by
the law do so at the risk of their jobs seems contradictory and indifferent
to the interests of the employees whose rights are supposedly at the
heart of our labor relations laws.
There is little doubt that if the balancing of interests now called for
under § 8(a)(3) were applied to the hiring of permanent replacements,
the Mackay doctrine would be overturned. However, to this day, the
Court has never analyzed the Mackay doctrine under contemporary
standards. And despite the critical assessments to which the rule has
been subjected, the Court has shown not the slightest inclination to
moderate its effects.80 The Mackay rule remains every bit as authorita-
tive as the day the Court announced it.
THE IMPACT OF MACKAY WHEN USED
There have been few detailed studies of the impact of the Mackay
doctrine. But what information we have paints a sad picture of human
misery and community destruction. One of the most carefully studied
strikes in this regard is the strike of 1200 replaced papermakers at the
Androscoggin Mill of International Paper Company in Jay, Maine, from
June of 1987 to October of 1988.81 The strike lasted sixteen months
before the union capitulated. The story of the Jay strike is a cautionary
tale about the Mackay doctrine in the contemporary economy. In the
aftermath of the strike, the hostility between former strikers, company
management, and replacement workers harmed the quality of the paper
produced. The former strikers, once exemplary paper workers, continued
to see the company as the enemy and the quality of their work inevitably
deteriorated. As one of the former strikers stated, ‘‘I go in every day
with the same thought, just because I’ve got my job doesn’t mean it’s
over. I’ve still got 600–800 friends on the outside and until they’re back I
80 One effort to overturn Mackay legislatively nearly succeeded. In 1990, the President
of the paperworkers union local whose members had been replaced during its strike in Jay,
Maine, persuaded a local congressman to introduce a bill that would have required
employers to wait sixty days before hiring replacements. The bill was embraced by
organized labor and passed overwhelmingly in the House of Representatives, but defeated
by a filibuster in the Senate. Subsequent efforts to revive the legislation during the Clinton
Administration also failed. Julius Getman, The Betrayal of Local 14 102–04 (1998).
81 Id. All subsequent quotes about the strikers and the community are contained
therein.
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refuse to be friendly with these people.’’ Remaining loyal to those on the
outside was crucial to the self-respect of those who returned to the mill.
Bruce Moran, a millwright, stated, ‘‘every time you see a brother or
sister that hasn’t got their job back you feel a very sick feeling knowing
the only way they will get their job is if a scab dies or quits.’’
Concern with loyalty meant that scabs were not to be helped. Brent
Gay, a senior machine operator, explained:
Some of them come ask you about problems. ‘‘What do you
think the problem is?’’ I tell them, ‘‘I don’t know.’’ Finally told one
guy, ‘‘I could tell you how to solve that. I’m not gonna. Every time I
do that, I’m cutting a guy’s throat on the outside, and I’m not gonna
do that.’’ ‘‘Oh, I understand.’’ He never asked me again after that.
The greatest anger continued to be directed at ‘‘crossovers,’’ strikers
who had abandoned the strike and crossed over the picket line. Five
years after the strike ended, one of the crossovers explained his bitter
view of the strike and its outcome.
Some people won’t speak to me that I’ve known for twenty years. I
can meet them face to face and they still don’t speak. That’s their
choice. A lot of times, I wave or I’ll say hi, and that doesn’t matter if
it is on the street or if it’s in the mill. I will ask them how their
day’s going or say good morning to ’em and they’ll answer you back.
But there is a few that to this day, they don’t speak at all. I see two,
a company, and the union that has spent millions of dollars. They
both lost the battle. Nobody won. There’s like a spirit of hatred and
bitterness in this valley. There’s no peace in this valley.
And things are just not improving, and I’m looking for other
opportunities. I’ve been praying about it, and I think the Lord’s
gonna tell me what’s gonna happen, but he said the first thing I had
to do was sell my house, and I got it up for sale and I’ll sell it. And
after that’s sold, I’ll work TTT something out.
A short time later he moved to Alaska.
Laurier Poulin, who was the last person to walk the picket line, left
the mill in 1993. One of the scabs said, ‘‘You gonna shake my hand
before you leave?’’ And I said ‘‘No, I didn’t shake your hand when I
came here, and I sure as hell am not gonna do it on the way out.’’ He
said, ‘‘What are you gonna do, carry it to the grave?’’ I says, ‘‘Yep, I told
my wife to put it right in the paper, in the obituaries. I want it in my
obituary that I’m not a scab.’’
Ray Pineau, a former striker, who testified before the Maine Legisla-
ture’s labor committee, stated that being permanently replaced was
more upsetting than walking into an ambush in Vietnam. Pineau’s
statement was made six years after the strike ended. The hiring of
permanent replacements fundamentally changed the once cohesive mill
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community both inside and outside the plant. Six years after the strike
ended, a former mill worker stated: ‘‘It has put brother against brother,
friend against friend, and neighbor versus neighbor. It will take many
generations before the hurt and anger will heal.’’ Another former striker
stated that the impact of the strike has been ‘‘devastation, break up of
families and friendships. This generation will never see a complete
healing.’’
Ken Finley, the town undertaker, described how the continued
division affected the funeral of a woman whose son Norman was a
supervisor at odds with his brothers, who were strikers.
It was a large family, and totally divided. Norm was very supportive
of the scabs, to the point where he got punched out a couple of
times. And when the funeral was happening, he basically was in one
area and the other family members were in another area. Not one of
the strikers went to see him. You could see the demarcation. It’s not
unique; you see the bitterness, even in death.
When asked if the passage of time was easing the bitterness he was
emphatic. ‘‘No, in five years it hasn’t changed TTT it’ll go a hundred
years. The only change is people moving in and moving out.’’
The papermakers were used to thinking of themselves as helpful,
cooperative, decent people, and productive members of the community.
The aftermath of the strike put this comfortable self-image into serious
doubt. One former striker was surprised by his own reaction to the death
of one of the replacement workers as the result of an accident, six years
after the strike ended. ‘‘Normally I am a compassionate man with
sympathy for those with misfortune. However, after reading the article,
my remark to my wife was, ‘I guess there’ll be one less scab in the mill.’
Not that I rejoice in the man’s death but sympathy for a scab comes
hard.’’ Another senior papermaker described the change in himself in
this regard as ‘‘unbelievable.’’
I was the type of person that anybody needed help I’m there. Two
years ago a car drove over the road up here, on the bank. The guy
was still in the car, upside down. He had to tell me who he was,
where he was from and where he worked before I’d touch him. If
he’d given the wrong answers I’d walked back over the bank and
done nothing. That’s bitter. That’s damn bitter. That’s what they
created.
The stress involved in learning to deal with the world in a new way
caused illnesses, divorce, alcoholism and even death. In 1994, six years
after the strike ended, Ken Finley, the town undertaker, stated sarcasti-
cally, ‘‘The strike is still creating business for me.’’
Town residents and former strikers agree that the strike was
responsible for increases in alcoholism and divorces. Henry Lerette
stated that:
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All during the strike and since its end, I drank with increasing
regularityTTTT My wife threatened to leave me if I refused to seek
help. I am now in therapy and attend AA meetings frequently. At
one recent AA meeting there were five other former strikers pres-
entTTTT I hesitate to blame the strike for my drinking problems, but
it sure didn’t help. I still harbor intense hatred for [International
Paper] and the scabs that descended like rats to steal our jobs when
we left the mill. I will take that hatred to my grave.
The devastating impact of the strike on the community was inevita-
bly linked to the Mackay doctrine. Charles Noonan, the former city
manager made it the central point of his congressional testimony in
favor of the bill seeking to overturn Mackay.
Christmas, birthdays, and other family occasions will never be the
same for many families in JayTTTT I suggest that before you pro-
nounce the permanent replacement issue ‘‘not broke’’ and working
well, you journey to Jay.82
I don’t have a lot of experience with strikes, and I certainly hope I
never have to go through another one—but I have been talking to a
number of town managers who have seen strikes, and the difference
appears to be when you add that element of the permanent replace-
ment worker that the level of violence, the bitterness, the despera-
tion on those picket lines goes up considerably because every one of
those replacement workers who goes in is taking someone’s job.
Conclusion
One point about Mackay is clear. Despite what many of its critics
have maintained, the rule the case announced is one intended by its
framers and for which the Board itself argued. A deeper problem that
any consideration of Mackay raises is the one that caused the strike in
that case to founder: the need for solidarity. The willingness of individu-
als prudently and responsibly to make cause with others, to make some
personal sacrifice for the common good even when they may not directly
benefit from it, is the sine qua non for the labor movement. Such habits
also are central to the survival of any democracy. No change in the law
and no judicially-developed doctrine can instill those attitudes or act as a
facile replacement for them. They require discipline and must come from
the people themselves. But the Jay strike demonstrates that, even with
remarkable solidarity and willingness to sacrifice, unions may be defeat-
ed by a combination of vast employer economic power and use of the
Mackay doctrine.
82 The ‘‘not broke’’ comment was a response to a previous witnesses’ testimony, who
had argued against changing the law on the grounds that ‘‘if it’s not broke don’t fix it.’’
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